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The idea of  a human rights challenge to UN immunities has made its way 
into the doctrine over the years, particularly as more scandals involving the 
UN came to light. From the lead poisoning of  a UN-led camp in Kosovo 
to the cholera epidemic in Haiti started by infected Nepalese Peacekeepers, 
the discourse around the extensive immunities international organisations 
benefit from has led to many discussions around the possible solutions to 
the plight of  the victims. Regarding human rights, it is the right of  access 
to justice that has been identified as a one of  the strongest concepts to rally 
around. Widely recognised in many international and regional texts, and – in 
theory – defended by human rights court, the right of  access to justice has 
however not been able to truly materialize as a challenger to immunities. 
Even further analysis based on its potential status as a jus cogens norm has not 
had much success. The status is still heavily disputed, and the very strength 
of  jus cogens norms in general against immunity has not found unanimity in 
courts. However, while an overview of  the jurisprudence shows a general 
rejection of  a human rights-based challenge of  the UN’s immunities, this 
article refuses to end on a pessimistic conclusion. From doctrinal analyses to 
dissenting opinions and even some court cases, the recognition of  the right 
of  access to justice – whether as a jus cogens norm or not – is starting to make 
its way in the human rights discourse around the UN’s immunities. While 
not yet a fully-fledged trend, a pattern of  resistance is forming against the 
majority of  the jurisprudence on the issue. 
Keywords: immunity; human rights; right of  access to justice; jus cogens.
Resumo
A ideia de um desafio dos direitos humanos às imunidades da ONU fez seu 
caminho para a doutrina ao longo dos anos, especialmente à medida que 
mais escândalos envolvendo a ONU vieram à tona. Desde o envenenamen-
to por chumbo em um campo liderado pela ONU em Kosovo até a epide-
mia de cólera no Haiti iniciada por soldados da paz nepaleses infectados, o 
discurso em torno das extensas imunidades das quais organizações inter-
nacionais se beneficiam tem levado a muitas discussões sobre as possíveis 
soluções para o sofrimento das vítimas. Em relação aos direitos humanos, 
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é o direito de acesso à justiça que foi identificado como 
um dos conceitos mais fortes a serem defendidos. Am-
plamente reconhecido em muitos textos internacionais 
e regionais, e - em teoria - defendido por tribunais de 
direitos humanos, o direito de acesso à justiça não tem 
sido capaz de se materializar verdadeiramente como 
um desafiante às imunidades. Mesmo uma análise mais 
aprofundada com base em seu status potencial como 
norma jus cogens não teve muito sucesso. O status ain-
da é fortemente disputado, e a própria força das normas 
de jus cogens em geral contra a imunidade não encon-
trou unanimidade nos tribunais. No entanto, embora 
uma visão geral da jurisprudência mostre uma rejeição 
geral de um desafio baseado nos direitos humanos das 
imunidades da ONU, este artigo se recusa a terminar 
com uma conclusão pessimista. De análises doutrinárias 
a opiniões divergentes e até mesmo alguns processos ju-
diciais, o reconhecimento do direito de acesso à justiça 
- seja como uma norma jus cogens ou não - está co-
meçando a fazer seu caminho no discurso dos direitos 
humanos em torno das imunidades da ONU. Embora 
ainda não seja uma tendência totalmente desenvolvida, 
um padrão de resistência está se formando contra a ma-
ioria da jurisprudência sobre o assunto.
Palavras-chave: imunidade - Direitos Humanos - di-
reito de acesso à justiça - jus cogens
1 Introduction
One of  the most obvious human rights problems 
that arise from broad immunity of  international 
organizations and their officials is the denial of  the 
fundamental right of  access to a court guaranteed 
to all persons.1
The right of  access to justice is systematically brou-
ght up as an argument against the immunity of  interna-
tional organisations in the many decisions of  national, 
regional, and international courts that have had to deal 
with the issue. This argument is also brought up in ca-
ses regarding State immunity, examples of  which will be 
used illustratively and comparatively. The more recent 
idea of  the right of  access to justice as a jus cogens norm2 
1 WERZER, J. The UN Human Rights Obligations and Immunity: 
an Oxymoron Casting a Shadow on the Transitional Administra-
tions in Kosovo and East Timor. Nordic Journal of  International Law, 
v. 77, n. 105. P. 123.
2 Also known as peremptory norms of  international law. See Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (adopted on 22 May 1969, 
is an interesting layer of  this complex issue, especially 
when opposed to a well-established rule of  internatio-
nal law – immunities of  international organisations, 
and, to a certain extent, of  States – which is consistently 
defended and upheld in court.
A brief  glance at the existing jurisprudence may 
make one think that this is a lost cause. As of  time of  
writing, there is no real possibility in the courts of  the 
right of  access to justice, whether recognised as a jus 
cogens norm or not, to bypass immunities of  internatio-
nal organisations or States. This paper will look into the 
contemporary doctrine on the right of  access to jus-
tice and jus cogens, but also into recent national and 
regional cases – including dissenting opinions - in order 
to get a fuller picture of  the discourse on immunities 
and human rights. Through these observations, one can 
paint a much fuller picture than what the current juris-
prudence shows, from a handful of  opposing decisions 
to judgements won by a paper-thin majority. The aim 
of  this paper is to map out the current jurisprudence 
on immunity as well as the opposing viewpoints: is the 
idea of  a human rights-based challenge truly obsolete?
The focus will be mostly on the UN, but State im-
munity will also be considered as a useful anchor point 
and a basis for comparison, as there are few decisions 
involving the UN directly past the ones revolving 
around the scandals. This paper does not intend to be 
a compilation and a full analysis of  all of  the courts’ 
decisions on immunity3. It is instead a snapshot of  the 
most important development regarding immunity and 
the right of  access to justice, with the UN’s scandals as 
a backdrop. The first part will delve into said scandals, 
highlighting the severity of  the situation. Then, in turn, 
the paper will examine the discourse on the right of  
access to justice and jus cogens.
entered into force on 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 art 53.
3 For a more complete but less recent assessment of  court deci-
sions on immunities, see Di Filippo Marcello, ‘Immunity from Suit 
in International Organizations Versus Individual Right of  Access to 



















































































2  The consequences of the UN’s 
extensive immunity: a series of 
scandals bringing the idea of a human 
rights-based challenge to the forefront
2.1 The UN’s de facto absolute immunity
The legal basis for the UN’s immunity can be found 
in its founding text, the Charter of  the United Nations 
(1945), though the extent of  the privileges and immuni-
ties at this point appears to be restricted by considera-
tions of  necessity. Indeed, Article 105, paragraph 1 of  
the UN Charter seemingly presents a functional basis 
for the organisation’s privileges and immunities: “The 
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of  each of  its 
members such privileges and immunities as are neces-
sary for the fulfilment of  its purposes”4. The privileges 
and immunities are only to be enjoyed as far as they are 
necessary, a position quite different from absolute im-
munity. And yet, they are now widely considered to be 
applied absolutely, despite the wording of  the Charter.
How did it get to this point? Paragraph 3 of  the 
same Article states that “The General Assembly may 
make recommendations with a view to determining the 
details of  the applications of  paragraph 1 and 2 of  this 
Article or may propose conventions to the Members 
of  the United Nations for this purpose”5. It did exactly 
that just a few months later, leading to the adoption of  
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of  the 
United Nations (thereafter the General Convention).
The General Convention granted the UN a wider 
range of  privileges and immunities than initially envisa-
ged by the UN Charter. Its Section 2 states that
The United Nations, its property and assets 
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall 
enjoy immunity from every form of  legal process 
except insofar as in any particular case it has 
expressively waived its immunity. It is, however, 
understood that no waiver of  immunity shall extend 
to any measure of  execution.6
4 Charter of  the United Nations (signed on 26 June 1945, entered 
into force on 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter) art 105.
5 Charter of  the United Nations (signed on 26 June 1945, entered 
into force on 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter) art 105.
6 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of  the United Na-
tions (adopted on 13 February 1946, entered into force 17 Septem-
ber 1946) 1 UNTS 15 (General Convention) section 2.
To further consolidate this change, this de facto abso-
lute immunity has also been recognised and upheld by 
various national and regional courts, including in pro-
ceedings related to the high-profile scandals in Haiti and 
Srebrenica7. 
It is important to mention however that while Sec-
tion 2 does grant absolute immunity to the UN, two 
caveats to this were built into the body of  the General 
Convention. The first is the fact that the UN can wai-
ve its immunity, although notably it has not done so in 
any of  the scandals hereinafter described. The second 
caveat is Section 29 of  the General Convention, which 
states that
The United Nations shall make provisions for 
appropriate modes of  settlement of
Disputes arising out of  contracts or other disputes 
of  a private law character to which the United 
Nations is a party
Disputes involving any official of  the United 
Nations who by reason if  his official position 
enjoys immunity, if  immunity has not been waived 
by the Secretary-General8
But once again, this caveat has its limits. The term 
‘disputes of  a private law character’ is extremely vague 
and prone to change, and the decision of  whether a dis-
pute is indeed ‘of  a private law character’ is made by the 
Secretary General, on the advice of  the Office of  Legal 
Affairs, with a notable lack of  transparency. In other 
words, this caveat is a caveat only to the extent that the 
UN itself  allows it to be.
The justification behind the UN’s generous privile-
ges and immunities is rooted in the concept of  func-
tional necessity9. Essentially, this is the idea that the 
UN needs these privileges and immunities in order to 
properly function, as they are the bastion against petty 
lawsuits by States opposing the UN’s actions. Evidently, 
this justification does make prima facie sense, as the UN 
could not efficiently fulfil its purposes while constantly 
burdened by legal actions. The other side of  this coin 
7 For details see Section III.
8 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of  the United Na-
tions (adopted on 13 February 1946, entered into force 17 Septem-
ber 1946) 1 UNTS 15 (General Convention) section 29.
9 See BOON, K. E. Immunities of  the United Nations and Special-
ised Agencies. In: RUYS, T.; ANGELET, N.; FERRO, L. (ed.). The 
Cambridge Handbook of  Immunities and International Law. Cambridge 
University Press, 2019. and BLOKKER, N. International Organi-



















































































is that, if  courts were to follow this reasoning – as they 
have consistently done so – the outcome for the victims 
amounts to what can be considered a denial of  justice10. 
Such a denial of  justice is apparent, and particularly jar-
ring, in cases involving mass claims, such as the scandals 
of  Haiti, Kosovo and Srebrenica, summaries of  which 
are presented in the following section.
2.2  A brief summary of the recent scandals 
involving the UN and the right of access to 
justice
Over the last thirty years, scandals involving pea-
cekeeping missions in Haiti, Kosovo and Srebrenica 
have brought to light the consequences of  such a broad 
system of  immunities.
2.2.1 Haiti
Following the 2010 earthquake which led to the 
deaths of  hundreds of  thousands of  people, including 
Peacekeepers already on the territory as part of  the MI-
NUSTAH11 operation following a 2004 Security Coun-
cil resolution12, the UN decided to increase the capacity 
of  the operation to help rebuild the country. In October 
2010, a contingent of  approximately four hundred Ne-
palese Peacekeepers was dispatched to Haiti and hosted 
at the MINUSTAH camp of  Mirabelais13. Soon after, 
cases of  cholera were observed in the locality, seemingly 
originating from a source very close to the camp, then 
spread following the path of  the main river of  the re-
gion, the Artibonite. Cholera, a disease most commonly 
spread by contaminated water, can usually be treated 
rather quickly via antibiotics and fluids. However, most 
of  the infrastructure of  the country had been destroyed 
in the earthquake and had yet to be rebuilt. Without any 
running water available, the inhabitants had no other 
choice but to use and drink the water from the Artibo-
nite. The result was predictably and devastatingly deadly. 
10 BOON, K. E. Immunities of  the United Nations and Specialised 
Agencies. In: RUYS, T.; ANGELET, N.; FERRO, L. (ed.). The Cam-
bridge Handbook of  Immunities and International Law. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2019. p. 213 “decisions by IOs not to grant a forum 
for claims, or not to abide by recommendations for internal review 
processes, are now being discussed as a denial of  justice issue”.
11 Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti (United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) 
12 UNSC. Res 1542. 30 apr. 2004. UN Doc S/Res/1542.
13 UNGA. Report of  the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
rights. 26 aug. 2016. UN doc A/71/367. para 14.
As of  2020, the cholera epidemic has caused more than 
ten thousand deaths. The victims and their relatives at-
tempted to claim reparations from the UN, culminating 
in a clear refusal in the US courts to entertain this. This 
was the case of  Delama Georges v. United Nations14, subse-
quently referred to as Georges.
2.2.2 Kosovo
In a similar but smaller scale incident to the Hai-
ti cholera outbreak, the UN also had to deal with the 
Kosovo lead poisoning case, where a few hundred dis-
placed people were installed in an UN-run camp. This 
camp was built on contaminated soil, and the inhabi-
tants unknowingly drank contaminated water, leading 
to health consequences such as high blood pressure, 
stillbirths, and physical and mental developmental pro-
blems in children. This case is significant as it involves 
a large number of  victims who had no previous links 
with the organisation, and so was a third-party claim. 
However. beyond the refusal to grant reparations, there 
was no court case to speak of. Regardless, it would not 
be difficult to predict the results if  there has been one 
based on the failure of  similar claims.
2.2.3 Srebrenica
The final major scandal relevant to this issue is the 
massacre of  Srebrenica, which caused approximately ei-
ght thousand deaths during the Bosnian War. Following 
the massacre, widely believed to have been at least par-
tly the fault of  the inaction of  the Dutch contingent of  
Peacekeepers present in the region at this time, an as-
sociation called the Mothers of  Srebrenica was created. 
Consisting of  the families of  the people (mostly men) 
who died, this association attempted to sue both the Ne-
therlands and the UN in front of  various courts. Their 
case was repeatedly dismissed by various Dutch courts 
until it was eventually heard by the European Court of  
Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2013, in the case Stichting 
Mothers and Srebrenica and Others v. Netherlands15, subse-
quently referred to as Mothers of  Srebrenica. Unfortuna-
tely, the Court’s decision did not overturn those of  the 
Dutch courts. Particularly, it rejected the argument that 
the UN’s immunity led to a denial of  the association’s 
14 Delama Georges v. United Nations. 834 F 3d 88. 2nd Cir. 2016.



















































































right to have access to justice, which will be explored in 
detail in the following section.
From a disease leading to thousands of  deaths, to a 
massacre considered to one of  the deadliest of  the Bos-
nian war, these three scandals have many notable simi-
larities. They are all third-party claims against the UN, 
that is, claims by victims that do not have a previous link 
with the organisation. These scandals have also had a 
huge impact on the UN’s overall reputation, particularly 
in Haiti where massive demonstrations took place when 
it was revealed that the cholera outbreak was almost 
certainly caused by UN Peacekeepers16. The final, and 
perhaps most relevant to this article, similarity is that 
the UN’s response to each of  them was identical. The 
UN’s position was that its immunity should prevail, and 
it should not – and could not – be compelled to grant 
any reparations to the victims. This response only ad-
ded to the backlash, but at the time of  writing, the UN 
has not changed its position on any of  these scandals.
The lack of  accountability in court for the UN has 
prompted many papers pondering possible solutions to 
what has become quite the conundrum: how can one 
reconcile a rule enshrined in a convention and consis-
tently upheld by every national and regional court with 
the sheer scale of  human suffering and accusations of  
denial of  justice? The idea of  a human rights-based 
challenge to immunities, especially one based on the ri-
ght of  access to justice, quickly cemented itself  as one 
of  the strongest potential solution to the problem.
3 The right of access to justice
The International Law Association describes the 
immunity of  international organisations from domes-
tic jurisdictions as a “decisive barrier to remedial action 
for non-State claimants”17. This “barrier” can even be 
identified as a denial of  justice18. More specifically in the 
16 CARROLL, R. Protesters in Haiti attack UN peacekeepers in 
cholera backlash. The Guardian, London, 16 nov. 2010. Disponível 
em: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/16/protes-
tors-haiti-un-peacekeepers-cholera. Acesso em: 28 set. 2020.
17 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION. Berlin Conference, 
2004. Accountability of  International Organizations: Final Report. 
2004. p. 41.
18 BOON, K. E. Immunities of  the United Nations and Special-
ised Agencies. In: RUYS, T.; ANGELET, N.; FERRO, L. (ed.). The 
Cambridge Handbook of  Immunities and International Law. Cambridge 
University Press, 2019. P. 213. See footnote 8.
context of  this article, it is gradually being recognised 
as a potential violation of  the right of  access to justice, 
which can be defined as the “effective access to an in-
dependent dispute resolution mechanism coupled with 
other related issues, such as the availability of  legal aid 
and adequate redress”19.
The right of  access to justice has been recognised 
in many regional and international conventions, such 
as the American Convention on Human Rights20 and 
the International Covenant for Civil and Political Ri-
ghts21. It is also contained in Article 6 of  the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), taken in con-
junction with the 1975 case of  Golder v United Kingdom22. 
While Article 6 states that “everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an in-
dependent and impartial tribunal established by law”23, 
it was not until Golder that the European Court of  Hu-
man Rights added that “the fair, public and expeditious 
characteristics of  judicial proceedings are of  no value 
at all if  there are no judicial proceeding”24. From that 
point on, Article 6 has been considered by the Euro-
pean Court of  Human Rights to also encompass the 
access to judicial proceedings.
As seen through the scandals summarized above, 
there are tensions between the right of  access to justice 
and the de facto absolute immunity that most interna-
tional organisations, and the UN in particular, benefit 
from. In fact, they are polar opposites to one another; 
as one should guarantee that a person can have access 
to judicial proceedings lest there is denial of  justice, 
while the other guarantees that the UN “shall be immu-
ne from every form of  legal process”25. Coupled with 
19 EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS. Access to justice in Europe: an overview of  challenges and 
opportunities. 2011. p. 9. For the purpose of  this article, the expres-
sion «right of  access to justice» will be used as an all-encompassing 
term to include the right to a remedy and the right of  access to a 
court. The mention «right to due process» has also been used, spe-
cifically in the Dire Tladi reports.
20 AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. Pact of  
San José, Costa Rica. Adopted on 22 November 1969, entered into 
force on 18 July 1978. 1144 UNTS 123. art. 8.
21 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT FOR CIVIL AND POLIT-
ICAL RIGHTS. Adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force 
on 23 March 1976. 999 UNTS 171. art. 14.
22 Golder v United Kingdom, 1975. 1 EHRR 524.
23 Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms (ECHR, as amended) art 6.
24 Golder v United Kingdom, 1975. 1 EHRR 524. para 35.
25 CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNI-


















































































the extent of  the UN’s ‘functional’ immunity – it is es-
sentially absolute – and the weakness of  the Section 29 
caveat regarding ‘disputes of  a private law character’ in 
particular, the outcomes of  the claims in the aforemen-
tioned scandals were sadly predictable. Claims regarding 
both Haiti and Srebrenica were heard by courts but did 
not succeed in compelling the UN to pay reparations, 
and their arguments regarding the right of  access to a 
court were rejected. The Kosovo scandal, on the other 
hand, did not result in a claim being heard before a 
court, national or otherwise; however, it is very likely 
that the conclusion would have been the same.
The claims regarding Haiti and Srebrenica were res-
pectively decided by the United States Court of  Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, and by the European Court of  
Human Rights. Although the latter of  these courts has a 
distinct focus on human rights, and even recognises the 
right of  access to justice, first in Article 6 ECHR im-
plicitly, then clearly in Golder, the decision remained the 
same in both courts. The UN’s immunity was upheld, 
and, as a consequence, no proper remedy could be gi-
ven to the victims.
In the case of  Georges, the court dismissed “the 
constitutional rights [of  the parties] to access the fede-
ral courts”26 by stating that this “does little more than 
‘question why immunities in general should exist’”27, 
using a precedent established in a sexual harassment 
case also involving the UN, Brzak28. It is a relatively 
straight-forward, if  not frustrating explanation, and one 
that is, with regards to the right of  access to justice, 
consistent with other decisions by US courts – Brzak of  
course, but also Boimah v United Nations29 and Mendaro v 
World Bank30. The reasoning itself  is questionable, but 
the US courts were not human rights courts. While it 
can be expected of  the courts to uphold those human 
rights, they do not make their decisions in a system ex-
plicitly created for the defence of  human rights.
This is however not the case for Mothers of  Srebrenica, 
and, to its credit, the ECtHR does give a more detailed 
reasoning behind its finding of  no violation of  the right 
of  access to a court.
1946, entered into force 17 September 1946. 1 UNTS 15 (General 
Convention). section 2.
26 Delama Georges v. United Nations. 834 F 3d 88. 2nd Cir. 2016. p. 21.
27 Delama Georges v. United Nations. 834 F 3d 88. 2nd Cir. 2016. p. 21.
28 Brzak v. United Nations. 597 F 3d 107. 2nd Cir. 2010.
29 Boimah v. United Nations. 664 F Supp 69. E.D.N.Y. 1987.
30 Mendaro v. World Bank. 717 F 2d 610. D.C. Cir. 1983.
The ECtHR has had to deal with many cases regar-
ding Article 6 in conjunction with Golder in the con-
text of  the immunity of  an international organisation. 
However, the first thing that must be mentioned here 
is that those cases are more often than not related to 
employment disputes, typically an employee or a for-
mer employee of  an organisation seeking remedies after 
an alleged unfair dismissal. The method that the court 
deployed over the years is therefore based on this very 
specific collection of  cases, which makes its use regar-
ding third-party claims such as Mothers of  Srebrenica (the 
most famous example of  a third party claim regarding 
immunities in front of  the ECtHR) rather awkward.
Regardless, the ECtHR did develop a three-part test 
in Ashingdane v UK31 to discern whether or not the rights 
of  Article 6 (including the right of  access to judicial 
proceedings, per Golder) had been violated, set out as 
follow. The limitation must have a legitimate aim; this 
legitimate aim should be proportional to the means em-
ployed; and the alleged limitation to Article 6 should 
not “restrict or reduce the access left to the individual 
in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence 
of  the right is impaired”32. The very idea of  ‘limitations’ 
to the right of  access to justice has been criticized by 
those considering that Article 6 should not accept any 
limitations33. However, even if  one were to accept the 
three-part test, it is very obvious that while it is held up 
as a way to check for and prevent violations, evidence 
shows that it has been reduced to nothing but empty 
prose, including in the Mothers of  Srebrenica case.
For instance, the ECtHR has struggled to reconcile 
the ‘legitimate aim’ condition with functional necessity, 
the very basis of  international organisations’ immunity. 
In practice, this basis for immunities alone is held to 
be as a legitimate aim, rendering this prong of  the test 
moot in any such case. This is made particularly clear 
in both Beer and Regan and Waite and Kennedy, two of  the 
most well-known ECtHR cases relating to immunities 
and the right of  access to justice, where we can read 
that, according to the Court “the attribution of  privi-
leges and immunities to international organisations is 
31 Ashingdane v United Kingdom, 1985. 7 EHRR 528.
32 Ashingdane v United Kingdom, 1985. 7 EHRR 528. para 57. More 
recently, the three-pronged test was reiterated (and used) in Waite and 
Kennedy v Germany, 1999. 30 EHRR 261. para 59 and Beer and Reagan 
v Germany, 1999. 33 EHRR 19. para 49.
33 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE. Germany 


















































































an essential means of  ensuring the proper functioning 
of  such organizations free from unilateral interferen-
ce by individual governments”34 and that the practice 
of  granting immunities to international organisations 
is “established in the interest of  the good working of  
the good working of  those organizations”35. The pro-
tection of  international organisations from interference 
via immunities is recognised by the court as enough to 
fulfil the legitimate aim condition, adding that the im-
portance of  this practice of  immunities “is enhanced 
by a trend towards extending and strengthening interna-
tional cooperation in all domains of  modern society”36. 
The Court’s conclusion is that a limitation on the ri-
ghts of  Article 6 does fit under the qualification of  a 
‘legitimate aim’, for the same reason those immunities 
are there in the first place. This justification of  functio-
nal necessity being something that the Court explicitly 
agrees with, it is not surprising that the conclusion on 
legitimate aim is that there will always be one, and it 
leaves little wiggle room for any other conclusion on the 
legitimate aim condition37. In a strange symmetry, ques-
tioning the legitimate aim as the Court presents would, 
in the words of  the US court in Georges, Brzak and many 
others, do “little more than ‘question why immunities in 
general should exist”.38
As for the proportionality condition, it was consi-
dered fulfilled if  the applicants “had available to them 
reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their 
right under the Convention”39. In the cases of  Beer and 
Regan and Waite and Kennedy, this translated into the pos-
sibility of  having access to the ESA Appeals Board. In 
the case of  Mothers of  Srebrenica, this is a little bit more 
confusing. The ECtHR does refer to its previous rulin-
gs of  Beer and Regan and Waite and Kennedy, but it also sta-
tes that the absence of  an alternative remedy (which the 
Court does recognise as no claims commission was ever 
put in place, in Srebrenica or elsewhere) is not “consti-
34 Waite and Kennedy v Germany, 1999. 30 EHRR 261. para 63 and Beer 
and Reagan v Germany, 1999. 33 EHRR 19. para 53.
35 Waite and Kennedy v Germany, 1999. 30 EHRR 261. para 63 and Beer 
and Reagan v Germany, 1999. 33 EHRR 19. para 53.
36 Waite and Kennedy v Germany, 1999. 30 EHRR 261. para 6 and Beer 
and Reagan v Germany, 1999. 33 EHRR 19. para 5.
37 This ruling was also used in the Mothers of  Srebrenica case, in 
an identical manner. See Stichting Mothers of  Srebrenica and Others v 
Netherlands, 2013. 57 EHRR SE10. para 139(c).
38 See footnote 26.
39 Waite and Kennedy v Germany, 1999. 30 EHRR 261. para 68 and Beer 
and Reagan v Germany, 1999. 33 EHRR 19. para 58.
tutive of  a violation of  the right of  access to a court”40. 
The Court adds that the previous judgements of  Waite 
and Beer “cannot be interpreted in such absolute terms 
either”41. Acknowledging the lack of  alternative means 
of  remedy set up by the United Nations, the Court sim-
ply explains that “this state of  affairs is not imputable 
to the Netherlands”42, avoiding the question of  the lack 
of  alternative means altogether. This allows the court 
to conclude that the legitimate aim was proportional to 
the means employed, thus denying that the association’s 
Article 6 rights had been violated.
And finally, the ‘very essence of  the right being 
impaired’ condition “is only routinely repeated in the 
list of  conditions to be assessed, but it has never been 
closely scrutinized”43, despite still being presented as a 
distinct prong of  the test. Based on this analysis of  all 
three prongs of  the Ashingdane test, it is no wonder that 
the conclusion is foregone.
The apparent conclusion is that the right of  access 
to a court, while being at least paid lip service to by the 
ECtHR, is not a secure guarantee against the denial of  
the right of  access to a court for the victims of  scan-
dals such as those discussed. The right may be in the 
European Convention of  Human Rights, but this only 
guarantees that the question will be examined; not that 
the violation will be recognised. Further, as seen throu-
ghout this section, the Ashingdane test itself  has subs-
tantial flaws. The legitimate aim is simply fulfilled by the 
same arguments for the granting of  immunities to IOs 
in the first place; the proportionality test was given little 
weight in the Mothers of  Srebrenica case, despite the lack 
of  alternative means; and the impairment condition is 
barely considered.
The ECtHR and the US courts have not been the 
only ones making such decisions on the relation be-
tween the right of  access to justice and immunities. 
Other courts have consistently ruled in favour of  the 
immunity of  international organisations. One such 
instance is the consideration of  the right of  access to 
40 Stichting Mothers of  Srebrenica and Others v Netherlands, 2013. 57 
EHRR SE10. para 164.
41 Stichting Mothers of  Srebrenica and Others v Netherlands, 2013. 57 
EHRR SE10. para 164.
42 Stichting Mothers of  Srebrenica and Others v Netherlands, 2013. 57 
EHRR SE10. para 165.
43 PAPA, M. I. The Mothers of  Srebrenica case before the Euro-
pean Court of  Human Rights: United Nations Immunity versus 
Rights of  Access to a Court. Journal of  International Criminal Justice, 


















































































a court in Canada in the wrongful dismissal case of 
Amaratunga v Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization and 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association44. In the eyes of  the 
Canadian Supreme Court, the right of  access to justi-
ce is merely procedural, and thus should be given even 
less weight than in the ECHR system – and as we saw 
earlier, even the weight of  Article 6 is not enough for 
the ECtHR to make a decision in favour of  the victi-
ms. This led the Court to reject the argument brought 
forward by the appellant of  a violation of  his right of  
access to justice. Indeed, in his arguments that the lack 
of  proper forum to air his grievances constituted a vio-
lation, the appellant attempted to use the ECtHR case 
law on denial of  justice, only for his argument to be 
swiftly rejected by the Court:
Furthermore, the European cases upon which the 
intervener relies arose in a different legal context, 
namely that of  the Convention for the Protection 
of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 [ECHR]. As for the Canadian Bill of  
Rights, the “right to a fair hearing in accordance 
with the principles of  fundamental justice for 
the determination of  rights and obligations” 
recognised in s. 2(e) does not create a substantive 
right to make a claim […] Section 2(e) is the source 
of  a procedural right, not of  a substantive right45.
The Canadian Supreme Court, through this paragra-
ph, gave even less consideration to the right of  access to 
justice that the ECtHR did, rejecting the idea of  a vio-
lation on the basis of  this right being procedural, rather 
than substantive.
A seemingly sensible conclusion here would be to 
dismiss the very idea of  the right of  access to justice 
as a possible solution against international organisation 
immunities. Indeed, it was rejected as an argument in 
the two major scandals involving the UN in recent years 
that made it to a court, including in a system designed to 
protect and defend human rights, and more rejections 
occurred in other national courts that dealt with the im-
munities of  international organisations. However, these 
are not the only cases to have dealt with the right of  
access to justice and immunity, even if  it was the im-
munity of  a State rather than that of  an international 
organisation.
44 Tissa Amaratunga v. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Oragnization. [2013] 
3 SCR 866.
45 Tissa Amaratunga v. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Oragnization. [2013] 
3 SCR 866. at 892.
Indeed, there has been some push back against the 
general trend of  upholding absolute immunities to the 
detriment of  the right of  access to justice. In one such 
instance, the Italian Constitutional Court46 gave a con-
troversial answer to the ICJ’s decision in favour of  Ger-
many in the Jurisdictional Immunities case47. Following 
this loss, Italian legislation was enacted in an attempt to 
comply with the ICJ judgement, but the Italian Cons-
titutional Court was soon faced with a request by the 
Tribunal of  Florence to evaluate whether or not those 
measures were constitutionally sound48. In particular, 
the Court looked at potential violations of  Article 2 and 
24 of  the Italian Constitution, which, combined, ensure 
the right of  access to justice by the norms adopted by 
the Italian legislation to comply with the ICJ judgement.
The decision was unequivocal:
the absolute sacrifice of  the right of  judicial 
protection of  fundamental rights – one of  the 
supreme principles of  the Italian legal order, 
enshrined in the combination of  Articles 2 and 24 
of  the republican Constitution – resulting from 
the immunity from Italian jurisdiction granted to 
the foreign State, cannot be justified and accepted 
insofar as immunity protects the unlawful exercise 
of  governmental powers of  the foreign State, as in 
the case of  acts considered war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, in breach of  inviolable human 
rights.49
The overall conclusion of  the case was to declare 
unconstitutional Article 3 of  the Law No. 5 of  14 Ja-
nuary 2013, as well as Article 1 of  Law No. 848 of  17 
August 1957 (Execution of  the United Nations Char-
46 Corte Cost, 22 October 2014, 238.
47 Where the ICJ decided against Italy in the dispute relating to the 
immunities of  Germany relating to acts committed during World 
War II. See JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE. 
Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening. Judgement [2012] ICJ Rep 99. 
The decision was criticized (See Judge Cançado Trindade’s dissent-
ing opinion: “In cases of  international crimes, of  delicta imperii, 
what cannot be waived, in my understanding, is the individual’s right 
of  access to justice, encompassing the right to reparation for the 
grave violations of  the rights inherent to him as a human being. 
Without that right, there is no credible legal system at all, at national 
or international levels.”), but no other decisions by the ICJ have re-
futed it.
48 Corte Cost, 22 October 2014, 238 para 1: “The Tribunal of  Flor-
ence raises the question of  constitutionality… of  Article 1 (recte 
Article 3) of  Law No. 5 of  14 of  January 2013… insofar as it obliges 
the national judge to comply with the Judgement of  the ICJ, even 
when it established the duty of  Italian courts to deny their jurisdic-
tion in the examination of  actions for damages for crimes against 
humanity, committed jure imperii by the Third Reich in Italian terri-
tory, in relation to Article 2 and 24 of  the Constitution”.


















































































ter) so far as it concerns the execution of  Article 94, as 
it forces the Italian courts “to deny their jurisdiction in 
case of  acts of  a foreign State constituting war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, in breach of  inviolable hu-
man rights”50. In effect, this decision represents a com-
mitment by the Italian Constitutional Court to protect 
the right of  access to justice as it is recognised in its 
Constitution, even if  it means positioning itself  in clear 
disagreement with the ICJ on the matter.
The decision even contains an indirect mention of  
the immunities granted to the United Nations and their 
relation to the Italian constitution:
The ICJ was established (Article 7) as the United 
Nations Organization’s principal judicial organ 
(Article 92), whose decisions are binding on each 
Member State in any case to which it is a party 
(Article 94). This binding force produces effects in 
the domestic legal order through the Special Law 
of  Adaptation (authorization to ratification and 
execution order). It constitutes one of  the cases of  
limitation of  sovereignty the Italian State agreed to 
in order to favour those international organizations, 
such as the UN, that aim to ensure peace and justice 
among the Nations (Article 11 of  the Constitution), 
always within the limits, however, of  respect for 
the fundamental principles and inviolable rights 
protected by the Constitution (Judgment No. 
73/2001).51
As of  the time of  writing, no decision by the Italian 
Constitutional Court have involved a primary decision 
on the UN’s immunities in relation to the constitutio-
nally recognised right of  access to justice. The Court 
making the same decision as it did in 2014 in a case 
similar to the claims regarding Haiti or Srebrenica is, for 
now, just speculation. But as the quote above shows, it is 
not out of  the realm of  possibilities that this hypotheti-
cal decision by the Italian Constitutional Court – or, in 
fact, by other Italian courts – might be modelled after 
their original decision on Germany.
This case provoked academic opinions that it could 
be seen as a possible beginning of  a different perspec-
tive on State immunity, particularly regarding gross vio-
lations of  fundamental human rights. Natalino Ronzitti 
urges us to acknowledge that the decision “constitutes 
an attempt to curb the conservative interpretation of  
the ICJ and of  other national courts”52 while Benedetto 
50 Corte Cost, 22 October 2014, 238 para 4.1.
51 Corte Cost, 22 October 2014, 238 para 4.1.
52 RONZITTI, N. La Cour constitutionnelle italienne et l’immunité 
juridique des États. Annuaire français du droit international, v. 60, n. 3. 
p. 14.
Conforti recognises that it was a “courageous” judg-
ment that protects “the fundamental values of  the state 
community”53.
Despite this glimmer of  hope, there are a number of  
caveats regarding this decision by the Italian Constitu-
tional Court. Firstly, it is a decision by a national court, 
rather than an international one. Hence, its influence 
is much smaller than a decision by the ICJ or by the 
ECtHR. Secondly, it concerns State immunity and war 
crimes, a context quite different from international or-
ganisations and scandals born mostly out of  negligence. 
Thirdly, this decision is quite unique and, despite the 
doctrinal enthusiasm, remains rather isolated.
Nonetheless, it creates a precedent that other natio-
nal courts may be able to rely on if  they want to challen-
ge the common understanding that the right of  access 
to justice cannot challenge immunities. The doctrinal 
support is certainly there.
However, while this is a hopeful step towards a grea-
ter recognition of  the strength of  the right of  access to 
justice, it remains, in its current form, entirely too weak 
to have an impact on a judicial decision regarding im-
munities. While most of  the cases concern employment 
disputes, third-party claims have not had much success 
either, whether against the immunities of  a State or the 
immunities of  an international organisation. This lack 
of  success is despite the gravity of  the alleged wrong-
doing, and in some cases also the lack of  any other ave-
nue for alternative remedies. All of  this put together 
does not bode well for any future challenges of  immu-
nities based on the right of  access to justice. Benjamin 
Brockman-Hawe sums the current position up perfectly 
in this passage, written before the Mothers of  Srebrenica 
case was heard by, and dismissed by, the ECtHR:
The Mothers of  Srebrenica litigation is a rarity, in that 
it involves sympathetic plaintiffs with a legitimate 
legal complaint against the UN who have no other 
forums in which their claim would otherwise be 
brought. If  a national court is unwilling to set aside 
the immunity of  the UN under such circumstances, 
it is indeed difficult to imagine a situation in which 
the right of  access would be great enough to justify 
setting aside the grant of  immunity54.
53 CONFORTI, B. La Cour constitutionnelle italienne et les droits 
de l’homme méconnus sur le plan international. Revue générale de droit 
international public, v. 119, n. 353. p. 354.
54 BROCKMAN-HAWE, B. E. Questioning the UN’s immunity in 
the Dutch Courts: Unresolved Issues in the Mothers of  Srebrenica 
Litigation. Washington University Global Studies Law Review, v. 10, n. 


















































































This seemingly impossible requirement to have the 
‘perfect’ victims and the ‘perfect’ case severely limits the 
impact that the right of  access to justice can practically 
have in a dispute involving immunities. Even with such 
conditions apparently met, the Article 6 challenge in 
Mothers of  Srebrenica still failed.
This section has shown that despite some encou-
raging decisions in domestic courts, the balancing act 
between the right of  access to justice and immunities is 
still leaning towards the latter in most cases. In the case 
of  the UN in particular, courts almost inevitable argue 
their way out of  prioritizing the right of  access to jus-
tice, even it is specifically recognized in the instrument 
they were created to defend.
What, then, could create an obligation for the court 
to consider the right of  access to justice, and not just 
dismiss it right away? What option is there left for the 
victims to enforce their right, especially as third-party 
claimants with no other alternatives?
The answer to these might yet be found in the use 
an interesting, although controversial, concept: peremp-
tory norms of  international law, or jus cogens.
4  A critical analysis of the idea of the 
right of access to justice as a jus 
cogens norm: a possible challenger to 
the rule of immunities?
As previous described, the argument of  the right of  
access to justice, while a seemingly well-protected gua-
rantee on paper, has failed to materialize in practice. It 
is either considered to be a simple procedural right (and 
therefore has little, if  any, influence in eventual deci-
sions) or it is considered more fully only to then be re-
jected. However, a potential recognition of  the right of  
access to justice as a jus cogens norm55 has been brought 
forward as a possible solution to this issue.
brenica case even made it before the ECtHR, can now be expanded 
to the Haiti scandal, with the same bleak conclusion.
55 which the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties defines as 
“a norm accepted and recognized by the international community 
of  States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is per-
mitted and which can only be modified by a subsequent norm of  
general international law having the same character”. See VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES. Adopted on 22 
May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980. 1155 UNTS 331. 
art 53.
The status of  a norm as jus cogens is not simply ane-
cdotal. The criteria are rather strict, and based firstly on 
the recognition of  very specific organs of  the UN, na-
mely the International Law Commission and the Inter-
national Court of  Justice, and secondly on evidence that 
it is also ‘accepted and recognised by the international 
community of  States as a whole’. 56
The possibility of  the right of  access to justice being 
recognised as a jus cogens norm raises two separate but 
related issues relevant to the potential defeat of  the UN 
or other international organisations’ immunities. Firstly, 
is there sufficient evidence that this right is, or could 
be, recognised as a jus cogens norm? Secondly, would this 
elevation to jus cogens status be sufficient to overcome 
the rule of  immunity as it stands today?
4.1  Can the right of access to justice be 
considered to be a jus cogens norm?
In 2019, a series of  four reports regarding jus cogens 
norms was released by Special Rapporteur Dire Tladi, 
making it one of  the most recent authoritative analyses 
of  the subject. In the fourth of  these reports, Special 
Rapporteur Tladi provided a list of  norms that have 
been universally recognised as jus cogens, and a further 
list of  other norms that do not benefit from the same 
support, but that have been argued to be jus cogens none-
theless. The result is a comprehensive list that, although 
it does not present itself  as exhaustive, is an efficient 
snapshot of  the opinion of  the international commu-
nity as a whole.
The report starts off  with the more straightforward 
list to compile, the norms that have both been recog-
nised as jus cogens by the ILC and/or the ICJ and that 
have garnered enough support within the international 
community to be decisively recognised as jus cogens. The-
se include, inter alia, the prohibition of  torture57 and the 
prohibition of  genocide58.
56 ILC. Fourth Report on peremptory norms of  general international law (jus 
cogens). By Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur. UN Doc A/CN.4/727. 
para 55.
57 QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OBLIGATION TO 
PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE. Belgium v. Senegal. Judgement 
[2012] ICJ Rep 422 para 99. para 99.
58 RESERVATIONS TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PRE-
VENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENO-
CIDE. Advisory Opinion [1951] ICJ Rep 15. p. 23 and ARMED 
ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO. New 


















































































The right of  access to ‘due process’, on the other 
hand, is mentioned in the category of  rights “whose jus 
cogens status enjoys some support”59. Special Rapporteur 
Tladi is understandably very careful with his words here. 
The support does exist, but there is enough uncertainty 
about its status that no solid position can be taken. In 
particular, Special Rapporteur Tladi indicates that there 
is pushback against the idea of  the right to due pro-
cess being recognised as a jus cogens norm. The courts 
of  Switzerland, which had to deal with a series of  cases 
regarding the freezing of  assets of  private individuals 
following Security Council sanctions, have consistently 
ruled against recognizing the right of  access to justice as 
a jus cogens norm. In one example, three different cases 
were treated by the Tribunal Fédéral Suisse against the 
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and Federal De-
partment of  Economic Affairs60. In all three cases, an 
alleged denial of  the right of  access to justice, specifi-
cally, the right granted by Article 6 ECHR was claimed. 
The claimants argued that both Article 6 ECHR and 
Article 14 of  the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights were jus cogens norms. The Tribunal Fé-
déral disagreed, stating in all three cases that
Contrary to what the claimant argues, neither the 
fundamental procedural guarantees nor the right 
to an effective remedy of  Article 6 and 13 of  the 
ECHR and Article 14 of  the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights take on the nature of  
peremptory norms of  international law (jus cogens)61.
In making that decision, the Tribunal Fédéral 
followed its own earlier judgement in the Nada case62, 
also regarding Security Council sanctions.
However, there has been some progress regarding 
recognition of  the right of  access to justice as a jus cogens 
norm in one regional court. The Inter-American Court 
of  Human Rights has so far recognised the right of  ac-
ment [2006] ICJ Rep 6. para 64.
59 ILC. Fourth Report on peremptory norms of  general international law (jus 
cogens). By Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur. UN Doc A/CN.4/727. 
para 134.
60 TF 2A 783/2006, 2A 784/2006 and 2A 785/2006 du 23 Janvier 
2008.
61 TF 2A 783/2006, 2A 784/2006 and 2A 785/2006 du 23 Janvier 
2008 consid 8.4 : «contrairement à ce qu’affirme la recourante, ni 
les guaranties fondamentales de procédure, ni le droit de recours 
effectif  des articles 6 et 13 et 14 Pacte ONU II, ne revètent pour 
eux-mêmes le caractère de normes impératives de droit international 
général (jus cogens)» (translation by the author).
62 ATF 133 II 450 consid. 7.3. 
cess to justice to be a peremptory norm of  international 
law in two cases, Goiburú63 and La Cantuta64), holding that
Access to justice is a peremptory norm of  
international law and, as such, gives rise to 
obligations erga omnes for the States to adopt all 
necessary measures to ensure that such violations 
do not remain unpunished, either by exercising 
their jurisdiction to apply their domestic law and 
international law to prosecute and, when applicable, 
punish those responsible, or by collaborating with 
other States that do so or attempt to do so65.
Judge Cançado Trindade, one of  the three judges 
who heard Goiburú, described the right of  access to jus-
tice in a later dissenting opinion in the Jurisdictional Im-
munities ICJ case as “a true droit au Droit, a right to legal 
order which effectively protects the fundamental rights 
of  the human person”66 which puts it, in his opinion, 
“in the domain of  jus cogens”67.
However, this clear recognition is not given much 
consideration by Special Rapporteur Tladi.  Indeed, 
both of  those cases were not even mentioned in sup-
port of  the recognition of  the right of  access to jus-
tice as a jus cogens norm. They are present in his fourth 
report, but not in the context of  the right of  access to 
justice. Goiburú, the most mentioned, is acknowledged 
only as a recognition of  the prohibition of  enforced di-
sappearances as a jus cogens norm68. This can perhaps be 
explained by the presence of  two main caveats. Firstly, 
it is generally recognised that the Inter-American Court 
and Commission of  Human Rights “have more readily 
found the existence of  norms of  jus cogens”69. One can 
63 INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Case of  
Goiburú et al v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Ameri-
can Court of  Human Rights Series C No 153. 22 sep. 2006.
64 INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Case of  
La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reperations and Costs, Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights Series C No 162. 29 nov. 2006.
65 INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Case of  
Goiburú et al v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Amer-
ican Court of  Human Rights Series C No 153. 22 sep. 2006. para 
131, INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Case 
of  La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reperations and Costs, Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights Series C No 162. 29 nov. 2006. para 160.
66 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE. Germany 
v. Italy: Greece intervening. Judgement [2012] ICJ Rep 99. para 217.
67 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE. Germany 
v. Italy: Greece intervening. Judgement [2012] ICJ Rep 99. para 217.
68 ILC. Fourth Report on peremptory norms of  general international law (jus 
cogens). By Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur. UN Doc A/CN.4/727. 
para 126.
69 ILC. Fourth Report on peremptory norms of  general international law (jus 



















































































argue that this is not exactly a solid argument – would 
the same criticism be levelled at the ECtHR had it made 
the same decision?70 – but it does go against the idea of  
an internationally recognised jus cogens norm. Secondly, 
even when taking into consideration this eagerness to 
recognise peremptory norms of  international law, those 
decisions have raised questions and criticisms. Prof  Hé-
lène Tigroudja has written that the recognition of  the 
right of  access to justice as jus cogens is “obscure” and 
made “without even any attempt to justify it”71.
Additionally, those decisions were made regarding 
claims against States, and not an international organi-
sation. There is no indication that the same decision 
would be taken in a claim against, for example, the UN.
Therefore, although the decisions of  the Inter-Ame-
rican Court of  Human Rights should be taken into ac-
count, the weight of  such an assertion can reasonably 
be doubted, as it was not enough – and neither were the 
national courts’ decisions mentioned in the report – to 
convince Special Rapporteur Tladi that the right of  ac-
cess to justice was globally recognised as a jus cogens norm.
However, this does not mean that there is no pros-
pect of  recognition as jus cogens in the near future. If  a 
court were to decide that the right of  access to justice is 
a jus cogens norm, it would at least have some support by 
national courts and the Inter-American Court of  Hu-
man Rights. These decisions are not insignificant; and 
may yet be the first steps towards the right of  access to 
justice being decisively recognised as a jus cogens norm in 
the years, or decades, to come. While these decisions are 
not enough to indicate a trend towards the recognition 
and acceptance of  the right of  access to justice as a jus 
cogens norm, they do form the beginning of  a pattern 
of  acceptance that could very well turn into a strong 
support for the recognition in the future. Moreover, the 
70 On the – often not as reconized as it should be – influence of  
the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights on jus cogens, see CAR-
DOSO, A. F. R.; SQUEFF, T.; ALMEIDA, R. M. Jus cogens: an 
european concept? An emancipatory conceptual review from the 
inter-american system of  human rights. Brazilian Journal of  Interna-
tional Law, v. 15, n. 124.
71 TIGROUDJA, H. La Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme 
au service de “l’humanisation du droit international public”. Propos 
autour des récents arrêts et avis. Annuaire français de droit international, 
v. 52, n. 617. p. 626-630. Original quote in French: «force est de 
constater que la manière dont le droit d’accès au juge a été érigé en 
norme impérative est obsure puisque c’est au détour d’une phrase 
que cette affirmation est posée, sans même tenter de la justifier 
comme la Cour l’avait fait dans son avis n°18 pour le principe de 
non-discrimination» (translation by the author).
very decision by Tladi and Tigroudja to essentially cast 
aside the decisions by the Inter-American Court as they 
are too forward and progressive is itself  questionable, 


















































































4.2  The impact of a jus cogens norm on the rule 
of immunities
Despite the current lack of  universal recognition 
and acceptance, it is worthy as an academic exercise to 
follow the jus cogens argument to its logical end. If  the 
right of  access to justice were to be considered a jus co-
gens norm, how would it fare as an argument against the 
immunity of  a State or an international organisation?
While it might be tempting to entertain the idea that 
a jus cogens norm will, by its very definition, trump the 
rule of  immunity, one should first wonder whether this 
is actually established practice. Since the right of  access 
to justice is not recognised as jus cogens, we will have to 
turn our gaze towards other jus cogens norms – prohibi-
tions of  crimes against humanity or torture – that have 
been held up as arguments that might prevail against 
immunities. Additionally, we will have to focus exclusi-
vely on the immunities of  States and heads of  State. In 
researching this article, no cases directly involving the 
opposition of  a universally recognised jus cogens norm 
and the immunities of  an international organisations 
were found. This of  course constitutes a built-in caveat 
to any conclusions reached; but if  a trend emerges, we 
will be one decisive step closer to a human-rights based-
-challenge of  international organisations immunities.
In the Jurisdictional Immunities case between Germany 
and Italy, Italy’s second argument was centred around 
the alleged violation of  jus cogens norms by Germany 
– in this case, war crimes and crimes against humani-
ty72. The argument was summarised in the judgement 
as follows:
Since jus cogens rules always prevail over any 
inconsistent rule of  international law, whether 
contained in a treaty or in customary international 
law, so the argument runs, and since the rule which 
accords one State immunity before the courts of  
another does not have the status of  jus cogens, the 
rule of  immunity must give away73.
The same argument was also raised in an ECtHR 
case, Al-Adsani v UK74, where the applicant “contend[ed] 
that the prohibition of  torture has acquired the status 
of  a jus cogens norm in international law, taking prece-
72 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE. Germany 
v. Italy: Greece intervening. Judgement [2012] ICJ Rep 99. para 108.
73 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE. Germany 
v. Italy: Greece intervening. Judgement [2012] ICJ Rep 99. para 92.
74 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, 2001. 34 EHRR 11.
dence over treaty law and other rules of  international 
law.” 75
However, both courts rejected the arguments brou-
ght forward on the basis of  immunity. For the ICJ, the 
issue of  State immunity is procedural in character and 
does not – and should not – concern itself  with whe-
ther the conduct was lawful or not. The Court rejects 
entirely the existence of  a conflict between the rules 
of  State immunity and the rules of  jus cogens, arguing 
that they “address different matters”76. The dissenting 
opinions in Jurisdictional Immunities reach different con-
clusions regarding this argument77, but the decision re-
mains the same.
For the ECtHR, the reasoning is slightly different, 
although it yields the same results. The Court bases its 
decision on the absence, in all the documents and jud-
gements brought forward by the applicant, of  a globally 
accepted rule that a violation of  a jus cogens norm trumps 
State immunity. The Court notes “the growing recogni-
tion of  the overriding importance of  the prohibition of  
torture”78 and has even recognised that prohibition of  
torture is a jus cogens norm79. However, it “does not ac-
cordingly find established that there is yet acceptance in 
international law of  the proposition that States are not 
entitled to immunity”80 in cases of  alleged acts of  tor-
ture. In a confusing paragraph, the court argues that the 
cases cited by Al-Adsani refer to “the criminal liability 
of  an individual for alleged acts of  torture”81, whereas 
the present case is about “the immunity of  a State in 
a civil court for damages”82. It is unclear if  there is in 
75 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, 2001. 34 EHRR 11. para 57.
76 Jurisdictional Immunities of  the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece 
intervening) (Judgement) [2012] ICJ Rep 99 para 93.
77 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE. Germany 
v. Italy: Greece intervening. Judgement [2012] ICJ Rep 99. para 212: 
“In effect, to uphold State immunity in cases of  the utmost gravity 
amounts to a travesty or a miscarriage of  justice, from the perspec-
tive not only of  the victims (and their relatives), but also of  the so-
cial milieu concerned as a whole. The upholding of  State immunity, 
making abstraction of  the gravity of  the wrongs at issue, amounts 
to a denial of  justice to all the victims (including their relatives as in-
direct — or even direct — victims). Furthermore, it unduly impedes 
the legal order to react in due proportion to the harm done by the 
atrocities perpetrated, in pursuance of  State policies.”.
78 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, 2001. 34 EHRR 11. para 60.
79 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, 2001. 34 EHRR 11. para 61: “While 
the Court accepts, on the basis of  these authorities, that the prohi-
bition of  torture has achieved the status of  a peremptory norm in 
international law…”.
80 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, 2001. 34 EHRR 11. para 61.
81 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, 2001. 34 EHRR 11. para 61.


















































































fact a difference here at all. If  the immunity of  a State 
could not be upheld, as the Court seems to tentatively 
hint at, in cases of  alleged acts of  torture, why should it 
suddenly be able to protect the State in civil proceedin-
gs born of  those same allegations? This criticism was 
echoed by the dissenting opinion of  some of  the judges 
of  the case. Indeed, despite the decision in Al-Adsani 
being ultimately in favour of  the State of  Kuwait, the 
matter of  the violation of  Article 6 was ruled on with a 
very slim majority – eight against nine. The aforemen-
tioned weak argument of  a distinction of  the effect of  
jus cogens in a criminal or in a civil proceeding was heavily 
criticized in the joint dissenting opinion of  Judges Ro-
zakis and Caflisch, joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, 
Cabral Barreto and Vajić, who argued that:
“It is not the nature of  the proceedings which 
determines the effects that a jus cogens rule has 
upon another rule of  international law, but the 
character of  the rule as a peremptory norm and 
its interaction with a hierarchically lower rule 
[…] The criminal or civil nature of  the domestic 
proceedings is immaterial. The jurisdictional bar is 
lifted by the very interaction of  the international 
rules involved, and the national judge cannot admit 
a plea of  immunity raised by the defendant State as 
an element preventing him from entering into the 
merits of  the case and from dealing with the claim 
of  the applicant for the alleged damages inflicted 
upon him.”83
In the judgement in Mothers of  Srebrenica case, which 
chronologically came after the Jurisdictional Immunities 
case, the ECtHR simply relied on the ICJ’s paragraphs 
on the matter, instead of  using the Al-Adsani jurispru-
dence:
International law does not support the position 
that a civil claim should override immunity from 
suit for the sole reason that it is based on an 
allegation of  a particularly grave violation of  a 
norm of  international law, even a norm of  ius cogens. 
In respect of  the sovereign immunity of  foreign 
States this has been clearly stated by the ICJ in 
Jurisdictional Immunities of  the State (Germany v. 
Italy: Greece intervening), judgment of  3 February 
2012, §§ 81-97. In the Court’s opinion this also 
holds true as regards the immunity enjoyed by the 
United Nations84.
This led to a clearer decision but, as we saw above 
in the Italian Constitutional Court decision, it is cer-
83 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, 2001. 34 EHRR 11. (Joint dissent-
ing opinion of  Judges Rozakis and Caflisch, joined by Judges Wild-
haber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and Vajić) para 4.
84 Stichting Mothers of  Srebrenica and Others v Netherlands, 2013. 57 
EHRR SE10. para 158.
tainly not without valid criticism. Indeed, the argument 
used certainly ought to be criticized. The courts do not 
pretend that the rule of  State immunity is a jus cogens 
norm. In order then to maintain that immunity, even 
faced with an actual jus cogens norm such as the prohibi-
tion of  torture, the courts have to resort to the bizarre 
argument that the rules apply to different ‘matters’, that 
they simply cannot be compared. No valid explanation is 
given for the reasoning, but it has remained unchanged 
since the ICJ’s 2012 decision.
This apparent refusal to entertain the idea of  a jus 
cogens norm ‘defeating’ a rule of  immunity extends 
even beyond State and international organizations im-
munity. Issues regarding immunities and jus cogens were 
also addressed in the high-profile Pinochet case before 
the UK courts. For the sake of  simplicity in a rather 
convoluted case, we will focus here on the final judge-
ment issued by the House of  Lords in 1999, known as 
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte 
Pinochet Ugarte (No.3)85. In this judgement, the Lords had 
to deal with the case of  dictator and ex-head of  State of  
Chile Augusto Pinochet. Specifically, the question was 
whether or not former heads of  State could be held 
responsible for acts, such as torture, committed when 
they were still in post. In other words, could Pinochet 
benefit from immunity as a former head of  State, des-
pite the norms violated, widely considered to have been 
peremptory norms of  international law?
The case was considerably more complex than pre-
sented here, where only the parts of  the judgement re-
garding jus cogens will be considered. The final decision 
was that Pinochet should indeed be held responsible for 
acts of  torture, but only those committed after the 8th 
December 1988, the date when all parties had ratified 
the UN Convention on Torture. While Lord Browne-
-Wilkinson, giving the lead opinion, did not recognise 
that the presence of  a jus cogens norm alone could defeat 
Pinochet’s immunity, Lord Millett’s concurring opinion 
differed on precisely this point:
In my opinion, crimes prohibited by international 
law attract universal jurisdiction under customary 
international law if  two criteria are satisfied. First, 
they must be contrary to a peremptory norm 
of  international law so as to infringe a jus cogens. 
Secondly, they must be so serious and on such a 
85 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate And Others, 


















































































scale that they can justly be regarded as an attack on 
the international legal order.86
Lord Millett’s dissent on this point shows an unders-
tanding – and a possible future usage – of  jus cogens as a 
real challenger of  immunities. This reasoning was prai-
sed by Prof  Bianchi, who insisted that
the characterization of  the prohibition of  torture 
and other egregious violations of  human rights 
as jus cogens norms should have the consequence 
of  trumping a plea of  state immunity by states 
and state officials in civil proceedings as well. As a 
matter of  international law, there is no doubt that 
jus cogens norms, because of  their higher status must 
prevail over other international rules, including 
jurisdictional immunities87.
But despite this dissenting opinion and the overall 
weakness of  the arguments in favour of  immunity re-
sisting against a norm of  jus cogens, the current juris-
prudence is still consistent, in line with the ICJ and the 
ECtHR. With the relative rarity of  cases involving im-
munity and jus cogens norms, and the overall acceptance 
from States that immunity should stay – which is not a 
particularly surprising notion, as States have a vested in-
terest in their own immunity as well as that of  IOs they 
are a member of  – the discourse on immunity and jus 
cogens in international law has not been allowed to evolve 
much further.
In the absence of  similar judgements involving the 
UN or other international organisations, these cases are 
the best indicator as to how such a claim might even-
tually be decided. It seems difficult to draw a conclu-
sion other than that international organisations would 
receive the same generous treatment in such a claim that 
States have.
However, this does not mean that, in a Manichean 
way, a jus cogens norm will always ‘lose’ against State and 
international organisation immunity. Through Lord 
Millett’s assessment or through the doctrine, there is a 
hope that future cases might follow this reasoning and 
reach a different conclusion. It may yet become the pre-
vailing opinion that if  the norm violated is a peremp-
tory norm of  international law, the violator should not 
be able to benefit from immunity. Of  course, this will 
only be helpful for claimants such as those in Haiti or 
86 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate And Oth-
ers, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 AC 147 (HL) at 275.
87 BIANCHI, A. Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet 
Case. European Journal of  International Law, v. 10, n. 237. p. 265.
Srebrenica if  the right to access to justice is ever recog-
nised as a jus cogens norm – another battle to win.
In conclusion, the right of  access to justice as a jus 
cogens norm was brought forward as a solution to the 
denial of  justice resulting from national and internatio-
nal court undiscriminatingly upholding State and inter-
national organisation immunities. However, the idea of  
the right of  access to justice as a norm of  jus cogens itself  
has not yet been consistently recognised, despite some 
national and regional decisions in this direction. Addi-
tionally, even if  the right of  access to justice were to be 
recognised as a jus cogens norm, it would probably not 
have the desired effect of  immediately trumping immu-
nities. Regional and international judgements by both 
the ECtHR and the ICJ have solidified the perception 
that it is not yet accepted that a violation of  a jus cogens 
norm should trump State immunity. The lack of  rele-
vant decisions on international organisations’ immunity 
complicate the matter, as this article set out to question 
whether or not a human rights-based challenge would 
work against the absolute immunity given to the UN, an 
international organisation.
5 Conclusion
After the various scandals the UN has had to face, 
and after recent decisions at every level of  jurisdiction 
involving the right of  access to justice, can it really be 
said that there has been much of  a successful ‘human 
rights-based challenge’?
Altogether, this snapshot of  the current jurispru-
dence on the matter does not paint a hopeful picture. 
The right of  access to justice is examined by courts but 
the result is almost always the same: a finding of  no 
violation. The status of  a norm as jus cogens, while gai-
ning some popularity in the doctrine and in one regio-
nal court, is not globally accepted. Finally, in any case, 
the strength of  a jus cogens norm itself  against immunity 
is unclear. While there is some progress, the decisions 
made by the courts are still, in their large majority, in 
favour of  immunity. Decisions by influential courts (the 
ICJ, but also the ECtHR) have so far brought the dis-
course to a halt, cementing – for now – the lack of  cre-
dible challenge against immunity.
However, the jurisprudence is not the only place to 


















































































rights-based challenge. Though only really present in 
dissent and the doctrine, alongside a few national and 
regional cases, a pattern of  resistance – not yet a trend 
– is nonetheless forming against the general acceptance 
of  international organisations and State immunity; as a 
consequence, the discourse on immunity is not as static 
and definitive as the decisions taken in all of  those cases 
might show.
Against the backdrop of  the some of  the most se-
vere scandals the UN has had to face over the last few 
decades, combined with the push towards greater ac-
countability of  international organisations that we have 
seen recently, another case might just tip the balance in 
favour of  human rights. While the jurisprudence is so 
far set in its way, it is not in a vacuum. The discourse 
around the right of  access to justice, jus cogens, and more 
generally the idea of  a human rights-based challenge 
against immunities is anything but a dead end.
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